For most scholastic natural philosophers, the subject matter of natural philosophy was 'mobile being [ens mobile]', a term that Thomas Aquinas used. 'Mobile being' rather than 'mobile body' was used because it embraced the motion of both material and immaterial substances. Natural philosophy was concerned with change as manifested by things in some kind of motion. As an anonymous fourteenth-century author expressed it, "the whole of movable being is the proper subject of natural philosophy". 3 Most of the subjects discussed were drawn from the broad range of Aristotle's natural philosophy.
Medieval natural philosophy was presented in three quite different literary formats. The first, commonly in use through most of the thirteenth century, was the commentary. In this format, whichever of Aristotle's natural books was the subject of the commentary, the author would present a few lines of Aristotle's text and then explain them while also commenting on them. He would then do the same for the text immediately following, and move through the entire treatise in the same fashion, paragraph after paragraph until the commentary was completed. The second, and most popular, way of proceeding was by way of a series of questions, each of which usually began with the word 'whether [utrum] '. In the Physics, we could readily meet a question such as "Whether the existence of a vacuum is possible"; in On the heavens, we might confront the question "Whether the whole earth is habitable"; from the Meteorology, a question on visual rays would be fairly common, such as "Whether every visual ray is refracted in meeting a denser or rarer medium"; and in questions on On generation and corruption, it would be frequently asked "Whether elements remain [or persist] formally in a compound [or mixed] body". 4 The third kind of treatise was the 'tractate', which was devoted to a single basic topic or theme. Thematic tracts were important because they offered an author the opportunity to pursue a single natural philosophical theme systematically and at length, something that could not be done in either of the first two formats. In the thirteenth century, John of Sacrobosco wrote his Treatise on the sphere in which he described heaven and earth. Indeed some tractates mixed mathematics with natural philosophy, as did Thomas Bradwardine's Treatise on proportions or ratios and Nicole Oresme's Treatise on the configuration of qualities and motions (Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum et motuum). 5 Because the question format was the most important version of medieval literature on natural philosophy, and because almost all questions followed the same general outline, it will be useful to present a schematic outline of a typical question: 6 (1) The statement of the question; (2) principal arguments (rationes principales), usually representing alternatives opposed to the author's position; (3) opposite opinion (oppositum, or sed contra), a version of which the author will defend -in support of this opinion, the author usually cites a major authority, often Aristotle; (4) qualifications, or doubts, about the question, or about some of its terms
[optional];
(5) body of argument (author's opinions by way of a sequence of conclusions); (6) brief response to refute each principal argument.
The question format was based on the structure of a medieval disputation in a university classroom. It was meant to present the affirmative and negative responses to a question and to resolve the question in the most rational and logical manner. Hundreds of questions, with much the same format, comprised the major part of medieval natural philosophy. As the overall structure of a typical question indicates, medieval natural philosophy was characteristically rational, logical, and well organized. So, indeed, was the commentary format, where Aristotle's texts were carefully considered.
There was, however, a major problem. Although medieval natural philosophers dealt with the physical cosmos in their natural philosophy, they did not integrate their cosmic discussions. In their commentaries on Aristotle's treatises, they simply considered Aristotle's texts in sequential order, confining themselves to the text at hand without any attempt to arrive at a larger picture. In their questions format -by far the most popular -they discussed one question after another in isolation, without any genuine effort to integrate questions. Rarely did they refer to earlier questions, or prepare the reader for a later discussion on a related theme. In brief, the 'big picture' of the cosmos could not in any way be included within commentaries or questions on Aristotle's natural books. I shall now consider the two topics mentioned earlier.
the influenCe of theoloGy and reliGion on the exaCt sCienCes and natural
PhilosoPhy
The overall relations between theology and natural philosophy were determined in the thirteenth century and remained in effect until the seventeenth century. Their interrelationship was largely determined by the academic structure of the medieval university, especially the University of Paris. This is so because of the four faculties that became typical of full-fledged universities in the thirteenth century, the arts and theology faculties constituted two of the four. The arts faculty was solely responsible for teaching natural philosophy, while the theology faculty was the exclusive guardian of the subject of theology. Of the four faculties, those of theology, law, and medicine were regarded as the 'higher faculties', which could be entered only by those who had acquired bachelor and masters degrees in the arts faculty. The arts faculty was thus the gateway to the higher faculties. As a consequence of having acquired the requisite degrees in an arts faculty, virtually all who earned a theology degree, or even studied there for a few years, were quite knowledgeable in Aristotelian natural philosophy.
It is hardly surprising to learn that the theology faculty had far more influence and power than the arts faculty. Theologians were the guardians of the Catholic faith, while Aristotelian natural philosophy as studied in the arts faculty was a potentially dangerous subject. It included a number of fundamental ideas that were unacceptable to Christians, the most notable, perhaps, being an eternal, uncreated world. During the first three-quarters of the thirteenth century, there was considerable tension between the Church and Aristotelian natural philosophy. Earlier efforts sought to ban natural philosophy, but this effort failed, and Church authorities then sought to eliminate offensive parts of Aristotle's natural philosophy, which also failed. In 1277, another technique was tried: the bishop of Paris condemned 219 articles -a fair number of which were derived from Aristotle's natural philosophy and from his great Islamic commentator, Averroes (Ibn Rushd) -any one of which, if defended, would result in excommunication. In the fourteenth century, interpretations of some condemned articles led to significant discussions about various concepts that Aristotle had regarded as "naturally impossible", but which had become "supernaturally possible" because God, by virtue of His absolute power, could do anything whatever, provided it did not entail a logical contradiction. Condemned articles formed the basis of discussions about the possibility of a plurality of worlds, the possible existence of extracosmic void space, whether bodies could move in void spaces with finite velocities, and other possible actions that Aristotle regarded as "naturally impossible".
By the end of the thirteenth century, after almost a hundred years of serious criticism and restrictions that might have brought an end to its existence, natural philosophy was completely accepted by the Church and its theologians. Although it is unlikely to happen, historians of science should view the Church's acceptance as a milestone in the historical development of science and natural philosophy. For if the Church had rejected natural philosophy as dangerous to the faith, it is highly improbable that natural philosophy would have developed much further in a hostile religious environment. As a consequence, the major scientific achievements of the seventeenth century would not have materialized until much later, or would not yet have appeared.
Once the Church accepted natural philosophy, what sort of relationship did theology and natural philosophy have? Was natural philosophy subordinate to theology; did they exercise significant mutual influences? Or were they fairly independent of one another?
Prior to the twelfth century, Christians regarded philosophy and natural philosophy as "handmaids to theology", by which they understood that it was wholly acceptable to employ these disciplines the better to comprehend Holy Scriptures. It was further understood that the "handmaids" were not to be studied for their own sakes, an attitude that was strongly supported by St Augustine (354-430). With the translation of Aristotle's natural philosophy into Latin, this changed dramatically. Natural philosophy was no longer just for theologians, but, as we saw, became the major subject of study in the arts faculties of medieval universities, where most students did not go on to become theologians. Aristotelian natural philosophy did however remain subordinate to theology and the Church in one significant way: where Aristotle had made claims that were contrary to the faith, as, for example, that the world is eternal and uncreated, such claims had to be labelled as false and could be assumed true only hypothetically, usually for the sake of some counterfactual argument. This condition, however, posed no serious threat to the study of natural philosophy.
We must now inquire into the mutual relationships between theology and natural philosophy. In his excellent book on science and religion, John Hedley Brooke declares: "From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, the study of nature had, in various ways, been subordinate to theological interests." 7 One might argue that, because theologians were dominant over natural philosophers in the medieval universities, theology was therefore dominant over natural philosophy. In the actual doing of natural philosophy, however, theology depended far more on natural philosophy than did natural philosophy on theology. Indeed, natural philosophy was wholly independent of theology and religion. It sought to explain physical effects by natural causes. Most theologians understood this. They were well aware that appeals to faith and the supernatural were not applicable to the natural operations of nature.
Two of the greatest medieval theologians -Albertus Magnus and St Thomas Aquinas -sought to avoid mixing theology with natural philosophy. Albertus's Dominican brothers requested that he write a book on physics that they could use to better understand Aristotle's books. In complying with their wish, Albertus declares that he will treat natural philosophy naturally, and not draw on his theological knowledge, "for if, perchance, we should have any opinion of our own, this would be proffered by us (God willing) in theological works rather than in those on physics". Thomas Aquinas expressed a similar opinion in a letter written in 1271 to a fellow Dominican. In reference to a question he had considered on the rational soul, Thomas declares: "I don't see what one's interpretation of the text of Aristotle has to do with the teaching of the faith." There are several ways of understanding the word natural. The first [is] when we oppose it to supernatural (and the supernatural effect is what we call a miracle).... And it is clear that the meteorological effects are natural effects, as they are produced naturally, and not miraculously.... The philosophers, consequently, explain them by the appropriate natural causes; but common folk, not knowing of causes, believe that these phenomena are produced by a miracle of God, which is usually not true.... 9 Buridan assumed, as did most natural philosophers, that in the physical world there was a "common course of nature [communis cursus nature]" -a phrase he used -that produced regular cause-effect relationships. But Buridan, and all natural philosophers in the Middle Ages, always acknowledged, explicitly or implicitly, that God could intervene at any time and alter or disrupt any natural cause-effect relationship. They also believed that such divine interventions were quite rare, and that, for all practical purposes, the "common course of nature" prevailed, or, as Buridan expressed it, "in natural philosophy, we ought to accept actions and dependencies as if they always proceed in a natural way". 10 Nicole Oresme also sought naturalistic explanations of physical phenomena and was hostile to those who invoked magic, astrology, and inappropriate appeals to God and religion to explain natural phenomena. He even wrote treatises against those disciplines (for a detailed description of Oresme's attitude toward the interrelationship between religion and natural philosophy, see the section on Oresme, below).
In stark contrast to Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, John Buridan, and Nicole Oresme, Roger Bacon (1214-92) advocated a union of theology and mathematics. Bacon rejected Aristotle's conception of natural philosophy. He regarded it as too narrow, because it did not include the sciences of perspective, astronomy, the science of weights, alchemy, agriculture, medicine, and what he calls Experimental Science. Thus Bacon included the mathematical sciences -perspective, astronomy, and the science of weights -as inherent parts of natural philosophy. He also firmly believed that theologians, and students of religion generally, must study the mathematical sciences. Unless they did, they would be inadequate theologians. He was convinced, for example, that geometrical optics was capable of illustrating spiritual truths. The different kinds of rays -incident, reflected, and refracted -could be used to interpret the spiritual infusion of grace. Roger Bacon was a strong advocate of interrelating the exact sciences with theology. And yet in his two major works on geometric optics -On the multiplication of species and On burning mirrors -Bacon included nothing about theology or religion. 11 Moreover, although Bacon urged all theologians and natural philosophers "to apply theology to natural philosophy and natural philosophy to theology", he failed to follow his own advice in two of his major treatises on the works of Aristotle: Questions on the eight books of Aristotle's Physics and On the heavens. There is very little about God and the faith in these two works. I conjecture that this occurred because it is extremely difficult to apply theology to natural philosophy. When this occurs, the result is "supernatural philosophy". 12 I suspect that most medieval scholastics knew this. One of the best examples of the intermingling of theology and natural philosophy occurred in the thirteenth century, when the empyrean heaven came to be widely accepted by theologians after emerging as a concept in the twelfth century. It was destined to play a minor role in medieval cosmology.
The Empyrean Heaven
The empyrean heaven, or sphere, was a strictly theological construct. 13 Theologians conceived it as an invisible, immobile sphere that enclosed the world. It was regarded as the most lucid and noblest of all heavenly bodies, worthy of being the dwelling place of God, angels, and the blessed. Although the great theologians of the thirteenth century assumed its existence, all recognized that the empyrean heaven was accepted on the basis of faith alone, and not by rational argument or observational evidence. As Thomas Aquinas explained in his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: "the empyrean heaven cannot be investigated by reason because we know about the heavens either by sight or by motion. The empyrean heaven, however, is subject to neither motion nor sight ... but is held by authority."
14 Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas did not mention it in their commentaries on Aristotle's On the heavens, presumably because they felt it would have been inappropriate to do so. Surprisingly, Roger Bacon, despite his strong belief that theology and natural philosophy must be intermingled, also made no mention of it in his commentary on On the heavens. In his Questions on De caelo, Albert of Saxony denied the existence of an immobile sphere, choosing to follow Aristotle. Albert therefore clearly rejected the empyrean heaven, an unusual move in the fourteenth century. However, once the empyrean heaven became an article of faith, most scholastic natural philosophers accepted it solely on the basis of faith. Indeed, it is even mentioned in a technical astronomical treatise, The theory of the planets (Theorica planetarum) by Campanus of Novara. An occasional natural philosopher -for example, Pierre d'Ailly (1350-1420) -even sought to demonstrate the existence of an immobile heaven surrounding the mobile spheres. 15 If the empyrean heaven existed as an immobile, invisible orb that surrounded our world, did it exercise any influence on other parts of the cosmos, especially the terrestrial region? A number of theologians were of the opinion that it did, including Thomas Aquinas, who had earlier, as we saw, insisted that the empyrean heaven was simply accepted on the authority of faith, and seemingly played no role in cosmic operations. But, some years later, Thomas argued that if the empyrean heaven did not influence inferior celestial and terrestrial bodies, it would not be part of the cosmos. And yet, how could the immobile empyrean heaven -which was not even regarded as a body -exercise any influence on terrestrial bodies? To cope with this, Thomas abandoned the common belief that only mobile entities could influence other bodies. By being at rest, the empyrean heaven somehow caused the first sphere below it -the sphere of the fixed stars -to move with uniform motion and produce the daily motion. The first, or outermost, moving sphere then activates the next sphere below, and so on down through the remaining spheres. Carried around by their orbs, the moving planets cause generation and corruption in the terrestrial region of the cosmos. 16 As evidence that a resting entity can affect other bodies and cause motion, Thomas of Strasbourg, who also believed that the immobile empyrean heaven influenced the earth, pointed to resting magnets that attract iron. 17 He took the action of magnets as sufficient evidence for the causal efficacy of the empyrean heaven. A number of other authors similarly believed that the empyrean heaven was a powerful influence on the terrestrial region; some even argued that it was more powerful and influential than the physical celestial spheres. 18 The empyrean heaven provided an occasion for scholastic natural philosophers to introduce a religious factor into the 'natural' operation of the universe. But whatever they attributed to the empyrean heaven was incapable of any plausible evidence or support. Most theologians were fully aware of this. They were convinced that it was the abode of the blessed, but many did not believe it exerted any influence on the physical world. The empyrean heaven may have been mentioned, and even discussed somewhat, by a number of theologians, but it did not become an integral part of natural philosophy and, as far as I can determine, it always remained simply an occasional religious intrusion into a secular discipline. It remained an essentially theological construct that was accepted as a matter of faith. By the seventeenth century, very few scholastic natural philosophers included the empyrean heaven in their discussions of cosmology, and it gradually faded away.
Most instances involving the impact of religion on natural philosophy, or science, are not as obvious as the empyrean heaven. They would be more subtle and indirect. One reason that numerous scholars are convinced that religion influenced natural philosophy in the Middle Ages seems to derive from the fact that most of the eminent contributors to natural philosophy and science were theologians, or had studied theology. It seems reasonable to assume that their writings on natural philosophy would have been influenced, to some extent, by the religious environment in which they spent their lives. Modern scholars are also convinced that because the Church was omnipresent and so powerful during the Middle Ages, it was almost inevitable that medieval scholars, non-theologians as well as theologians, would reveal some influences of their religious backgrounds in their written treatises, both in their theological works and in their essentially secular treatises in natural philosophy.
All of this seems plausible but is of little use until we actually examine treatises in science and natural philosophy, and identify potential religious influences and determine whether they actually influenced the substantive content of the treatise. Religious influences were either relatively inconsequential or had some influence on the content of the treatise.
The Exact Sciences
In treatises on the exact sciences -mathematics, astronomy, geometrical optics, and mechanics -there were virtually no religious or external influences of any kind. Most were written in the austere and rigorous manner that had become customary since Greek Antiquity.
Perhaps the most famous work in the genre of the exact sciences is a widely known medieval treatise on mechanics titled The book of Jordanus de Nemore on the theory of weight (Jordani de Nemore Liber de ratione ponderis). This treatise by Jordanus de Nemore (fl. c. 1220) is in the Greek tradition. Although it is virtually certain that Jordanus believed in God, he did not introduce God or religion into his rigorously mathematical treatise. One may say the same for the later treatise on the same theme by Blasius of Parma (c. 1345-1416), The treatise on weights of Master Blasius of Parma. 19 God may have been mentioned in a handful of treatises, but those citations are not relevant to the content of the treatise. Hence we may move on to the relationships between theology, or religion, and natural philosophy.
Natural Philosophy
Although the influences of religion and theology seem more obvious in treatises on natural philosophy, their substantive impact was almost negligible. In an earlier essay, I distinguished four categories in which religion and theology appear in treatises on medieval natural philosophy 20 -that is, I identified the kinds of discussions that were likely to involve mentions of God and faith. They are:
1. Passages where Aristotle had occasion to speak of God or gods, or to mention the divine.
In On the heavens (1.9.278b.13-15), Aristotle declares that we recognize that the upper region of the world should be called by the name "heaven", because it is the "seat of all that is divine". In his commentary on this passage, Thomas Aquinas explains that all divine things are "up", which is why "up" is always assigned to God. 21 2. Discussions in which opinions contrary to the faith -often expressed by Aristotle -were mentioned (on these occasions, the authors had to rectify the situation in favour of the faith).
In his Questions on De caelo, John Buridan takes issue with Aristotle's claim that nothing corruptible, or which has the potentiality for not being, can always exist in the future. Buridan proclaims, "this is in fact false and against the faith because all things except God are corruptible and at some time they are not able to be because they could be annihilated by God. And yet many things are perpetuated and always remain". 4. God's absolute power was frequently invoked to illustrate how God could do anything short of a logical contradiction. The term God, deus in Latin, turns up rather frequently, because medieval natural philosophers were intrigued with hypothetical, or counterfactual, situations in which God was imagined to exercise His supernatural power to create things that Aristotle had regarded as naturally impossible. In his Questions on the Physics (Book 3, qu. 6), Albert of Saxony imagined that God annihilates all celestial bodies except the moon, which is in motion. As the only body in motion, Albert asks how we should regard the moon's motion in light of the assumption that there are no other bodies to which its motion can be related. Albert imagines a similar situation and then assumes that God fuses all the celestial orbs and all bodies below the moon into one continuous mass. Because nothing exists outside of this continuous cosmic sphere, and there is therefore nothing to which its motion can be related, Albert, once again, asks how we should regard the motion of this single mass of continuous matter? John Buridan and Nicole Oresme also presented counterfactuals involving God's absolute power (some of these will be discussed below). 24 The four categories described here encompass most of the 'religious' insertions that appeared in medieval Aristotelian natural philosophy. I have examined 310 questions distributed over five questions treatises on five of Aristotle's natural philosophy treatises, 25 and found that these 'religious' insertions did not exert any significant influence on the basically secular nature of natural philosophy. But what about the widespread influence of counterfactual assumptions involving appeals to God's absolute power? I believe these counterfactuals played a significant role in the history of science. But the discussions of these counterfactuals relied solely on natural philosophy, and were certainly not religious in character. Once God was assumed to have produced this or that supernatural action, the rest of the discussions utilized only natural knowledge, not knowledge about the faith or the Bible.
The Unusual Views of Nicole Oresme
I believe that a significant test case of my argument can be found in the approach and attitude of Nicole Oresme toward the interrelationship between faith and natural philosophy. Oresme, who spent the last five years of his life (1377-82) as Bishop of Lisieux, was a distinguished theologian and defender of the faith, as well as an outstanding natural philosopher and mathematician -probably the most brilliant scientific thinker of the Middle Ages. One of his most unusual contributions sheds light on his attitude toward the relations between religion and natural philosophy. Oresme wrote a number of treatises in which he sought to determine whether the celestial motions were commensurable or incommensurable. 26 In his treatise On ratios of ratios (De proportionibus proportionum), Oresme deals with force-resistance relationships involving any two ratios of the form A/B = (C/D) p/q . The ratio p/q, or the exponent (Oresme did not use that term), is called a "ratio of ratios", because it is a ratio that relates the two ratios A/B and C/D, which may be rational or irrational. If the two ratios are commensurable, they will be related by a rational exponent. For example, 2/1 1/2 and 2/1 form a rational "ratio of ratios", because 2/1 = [(2/1)
, where the exponent 2/1 is rational. The ratios 27/1 and 3/1 also form a rational ratio of ratios, because 27/1 = (3/1)
, where the exponent, 3/1, is rational. Each pair of ratios in this relationship is commensurable. But if the ratios were 6/1 and 3/1, we would have an irrational ratio of ratios, because 6/1 ≠ (3/1) p/q . The reason for this is that the ratio p/q is irrational, from which it follows that the ratios 6/1 and 3/1 are incommensurable. 27 He concluded that most relationships between terrestrial velocities are irrational and therefore not precisely representable. In his Treatise on the commensurabililty and incommensurability of the celestial motions, Oresme applied his ideas to purely kinematic relations between celestial motions, concluding that it is mathematically probable that the celestial motions are incommensurable. Oresme recognized that although he had not proven that the celestial motions are incommensurable, he had shown that celestial incommensurability was mathematically probable. Thus he concluded, and proclaimed, that predictive astrology was utterly implausible and urged its rejection -in vain, we might add -in a number of treatises directed against astrology. Although Oresme did not seriously apply his incommensurability doctrine to terrestrial velocities produced by force-resistance relationships, he was very likely well aware that one could not precisely determine the force-resistance ratios that produced incommensurable velocities. By such an application of mathematics to nature, Oresme undoubtedly became convinced that our knowledge of nature and its causes could be only approximate, not precise. Indeed, in lieu of precise data about natural phenomena, Oresme was quite prepared to accept approximations, as we learn from his treatise On ratios of ratios where he says we should investigate whether any ratio given, or to be given to us, is greater or smaller than such an irrational, unknowable, and unnameable ratio. Finally, in this way we can find two ratios sufficiently close so that such an unknown ratio will be greater than the lesser and smaller than the greater. And this ought to suffice. 28 Later, toward the end of the same chapter, Oresme offers a proposition to explain situations involving unknown ratios:
When there have been proposed any two things whatever acquirable [or traversable] by a continuous motion and whose ratio is unknown, it is probable that they are incommensurable. And if more are proposed, it is more probable that any [one of them] is incommensurable to any [other] . 29 Not surprisingly, Oresme's theories about the role of incommensurability of quantities and phenomena in the physical world led him to have considerable doubts about our ability to acquire precise knowledge about nature. He was sceptical about human ability to identify exactly the causes of natural effects. 30 He was convinced that articles of faith are no less reasonable than many beliefs in natural philosophy. Although the faith assumes that miracles have occurred -for example, the Resurrection -and will occur, "it seems to me", Oresme declares "that many things equally miraculous are assumed in philosophy and are [ 31 Oresme emphasized that our knowledge about nature and natural causes was no more intelligible than our knowledge of the articles of faith. Reason was no better suited to aid natural philosophy than it was to interpret the articles of faith. Despite defending his faith by weakening confidence in natural philosophy, Oresme did not intermingle the two. He did not attempt to "Christianize" science or natural philosophy. In some of his works, he injected many references to the Bible, often to buttress an argument, or by way of an analogy, but never to demonstrate an argument. Indeed, in his Configurations of qualities and motions, he includes approximately fifty citations to twenty-three different books of the Bible 32 but "he did so only by way of example or for additional support, but in no sense to demonstrate an argument". 33 Most of the biblical references occur in sections on magic, visions and the soul, but rarely appear in sections where mathematics plays a significant role. Marshall Clagett, the editor and translator of Oresme's On the configurations of qualities and motions, declares that "What is particularly important is that none of the authors quoted seems to have directed the line of his argument, which is clearly his own, whether it be the basic outline of the configuration doctrine or its application to phenomena". 34 In his Le livre du ciel et du monde, Oresme makes many references to Scripture, frequently introducing Biblical passages by way of example and as appeals to faith. He even devotes the last chapter of his commentary to "the body of Jesus Christ". 35 But Le livre du ciel et du monde was unique among all the commentaries on Aristotle's natural books. It was a French translation of, and commentary on, Aristotle's On the heavens and was made by Oresme at the request of the French King, Charles V. As a treatise on natural philosophy, Oresme's commentary is one of a kind and cannot be used to make or repudiate any claims about the interrelations of natural philosophy and religion during the Middle Ages. It was in no way intended for a university audience, but was written for courtiers at the court of Charles V. It differs radically from Oresme's much earlier Questions on De caelo, which was indeed written for a traditional university-educated audience towards which virtually all questions treatises were directed.
Despite numerous biblical references and religious discussions in a few of his treatises on natural philosophy, Oresme avoided explaining natural phenomena by appeals to the Bible or to his faith. He was totally committed to interpreting natural phenomena by natural causes. Indeed, he was also a strong opponent of explanations employing magic or appeals to the supernatural. But, as we have seen, he was also convinced that much of our knowledge of natural philosophy was uncertain, an attitude he undoubtedly derived from his own mathematical contributions, which convinced him that most phenomena involving continuous magnitudes were probably incommensurable and therefore, at best, could provide us with only approximate knowledge of their causal relationships. Although he firmly believed that humans were largely unable to acquire exact causal knowledge of most natural phenomena, Oresme would never have substituted religious or occult explanations for natural causes. Nowhere is Oresme's attitude toward natural, occult and religious knowledge better revealed than in his Prologue to On the causes of marvels (De causis mirabilium, sometimes known as Quodlibeta), a treatise written around 1370, which makes it one of Oresme's later works. After an introductory sentence, he begins his Prologue with these words:
In order to set people's minds at rest to some extent, I propose here, although it goes beyond what was intended, to show the causes of some effects which seem to be marvels and to show that the effects occur naturally, as do the others at which we commonly do not marvel. There is no reason to take recourse to the heavens, the last refuge of the weak, or demons, or to our glorious God as if He would produce these effects directly, more so than those effects whose causes we believe are well known to us.
One thing I would note here is that we should properly assign to particular effects particular causes, but this is very difficult unless a person looks at effects one at a time and their particular circumstances. Consequently, it will suffice for me to show that the things mentioned occur naturally, as I just said, and that no illogicality is involved. 36 With these words from Oresme, I conclude my section on the influence of religion and theology on natural philosophy and the exact sciences, and turn my attention to the role of reason, imagination, and counterfactuals in creating a spirit of inquiry that enhanced the development of natural philosophy, and ultimately the development of science.
the role of reason and imaGination in natural PhilosoPhy
Except for disagreements with articles of the Christian faith, the universe that Aristotle described and proclaimed in his treatises on natural philosophy remained the almost universally accepted view of the world from approximately 1200 to 1600. 37 In arriving at, and sustaining, that worldview, empiricism and experiment played a minuscule role. If medieval natural philosophers largely accepted the world and its operations as Aristotle had presented them, they also created another world for themselves in which they not only disagreed with a number of Aristotle's explanations about the real world, but also applied their imaginations to things he had regarded as naturally impossible. They sought to show that a number of ideas Aristotle had considered absurd and impossible were indeed possible and intelligible, although the likelihood that they had existed, or would ever come into existence, was deemed utterly implausible. Imagination had, of course, always played a significant role in science and natural philosophy. But in Western Europe during the late Middle Ages, natural philosophers began to use their imaginations in ways that had never been done before in any other civilization or culture. 38 They often proclaimed their use of the imagination by the phrase secundum imaginationem, "according to the imagination".
Departures from Aristotle's Ideas about the Real World
A few examples will reveal how medieval natural philosophers applied their imaginations to replace some of Aristotle's key explanations of physical phenomena. Aristotle's description of projectile motion relied on air, or the external medium, to account for the continued motion of the projectile once it was launched. Air external to the projectile continued pushing it along until it fell to its natural place. John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, and others, rejected air as the mover of projectiles and insisted that it was an impressed force, or impetus, within the projectile that moved it along. To eliminate the air as the cause of projectile motion, Buridan offered a number of counter arguments, among which was the following:
A lance having a conical posterior as sharp as its anterior would be moved after projection just as swiftly as it would be without a sharp conical posterior. But surely the air following could not push a sharp end in this way, because the air would be easily divided by the sharpness. 39 By providing imaginary examples of situations in which the air could not be the projector of a material body, Buridan and other scholastics showed the inadequacy of Aristotle's explanation. Aristotle had also argued that a "moment of rest [quies media]" had to intervene between the upward motion of a heavy body and its natural downward motion. If there were no moment of rest, these two contrary motions would constitute a single, continuous motion. The motions would therefore not be contrary.
To refute Aristotle, scholastics utilized an argument, first introduced by Islamic authors. It may be cited as the "millstone-bean" example. In the fourteenth century, Marsilius of Inghen countered Aristotle's "moment of rest" as follows:
The proof is that if a bean were projected upward against a millstone which is descending, it does not appear probable that the bean could rest before descending, for if it did rest through some time it would stop the millstone from descending, which seems impossible. 40 Buridan proposed another counter example involving a lance and a fly, declaring: "if a lance is hanging from a tree [and] a fly ascends on that lance and the cord by which the lance is hanging is broken, and then the lance and the fly fall down, the motion of the fly will be contrary, from up to down, but there will be no moment of rest." 41 At the geometric centre of our cosmos, Aristotle assumed that the earth lay absolutely immobile, moving neither rotationally nor rectilinearly. Medieval scholarsincluding Thomas Aquinas -were well aware that the ancient Greeks had considered the possibility that the earth rotated daily on its axis, rather than lying immobile. Aristarchus of Samos, and others, had argued that a daily axially rotating earth, with the heaven and stars immobile, could account for the astronomical phenomena as well as the alternative hypothesis: an immobile earth with the heavens and stars rotating around it. 42 Buridan and Oresme seriously considered the possibility of the earth's daily axial rotation and both did so in their commentaries on Aristotle's On the heavens (De caelo). Buridan gave a series of sound and powerful "persuasive arguments [persuasiones]" in favour of axial rotation, relying heavily on the concept of relative motion. But he eventually mustered rebuttal arguments against axial rotation and opted for Aristotle's traditional opinion.
Oresme also ultimately aligned himself with Aristotle's traditional opinion, but not before he made it seem less plausible than its alternative. As did Buridan, Oresme utilized the relativity of motion for his most basic arguments in behalf of the earth's axial rotation. The arguments he presents for it appear more persuasive than those he mustered for an immobile earth. In his arguments for a rotating earth, Copernicus did not surpass Oresme's arguments. In the end, however, Oresme concluded that neither experience nor reason could demonstrate either alternative, for which reason he opted for the traditional opinion. He did this because he saw no good reasons for abandoning the traditional interpretation, which had the advantage of being in agreement with Scripture. At the conclusion of his discussion, Oresme declares: However, everyone maintains, and I think myself, that the heavens do move and not the earth: for God hath established the world which shall not be moved, in spite of contrary reasons because they are clearly not conclusive persuasions. However, after considering all that has been said, one could then believe that the earth moves and not the heavens, for the opposite is not clearly evident. Nevertheless, at first sight, this seems as much against natural reason as, or more against natural reason than, all or many of the articles of our faith. What I have said by way of diversion or intellectual exercise can in this manner serve as a valuable means of refuting and checking those who would like to impugn our faith by argument. 43 But if Buridan did not believe the earth rotated, he did depart dramatically from Aristotle's claim of an immobile earth. He argued that the earth moved with small rectilinear motions, which arise as a result of continuous geological changes on the earth's surface. These geological changes cause the earth's centre of magnitude to change constantly so that it no longer coincides with the earth's geometric centre. It is the earth's centre of gravity that coincides with the earth's geometric centre.
As the earth's centre of gravity constantly shifts in accordance with the continually changing centre of magnitude, each new centre of gravity moves sufficiently to coincide with the geometric centre of the universe. To achieve this, the earth actually moves a short rectilinear distance. Therefore, contrary to what Aristotle declared, the earth is not at rest in the centre of the universe, but constantly moves short rectilinear distances to bring its centre of gravity into coincidence with the centre of the universe. 44 Additional examples could be cited, but we must now describe how scholastics utilized hypothetical, or counterfactual, examples to enter a world, or worlds, that Aristotle had regarded as impossible and absurd.
Imaginary Worlds Beyond Our World
Although he firmly believed that nothing whatever could exist beyond our world -neither void spaces nor other worlds -Aristotle acknowledged that those who believed that an infinite magnitude, or an infinity of worlds, existed beyond our world did so because the human mind is always capable of imagining more things beyond any limit. This is so, because these things "never give out in our thought" (Physics 3.4.203b.26). Most scholastic authors agreed with Aristotle in denying the existence of other worlds as well as any kind of extracosmic void space. And yet, because God, by his supernatural power, was able to create as many worlds as He wished, a number of scholastic natural philosophers imagined that God had done so.
A plurality of worlds could be either successive or simultaneous. Successive worlds were not often discussed, although all agreed that God could destroy one world and replace it with another, and He could do this endlessly. It was simultaneous worlds that captured their attention.
As with a number of themes in the history of science, Nicole Oresme presented the most significant array of arguments on this topic. 45 He considered two kinds of simultaneous worlds: (1) concentric or eccentric, and (2) separately existing worlds. He focused attention on simultaneous concentric worlds, which had already been discussed and rejected by William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century. Oresme's presentation bears no resemblance to those of his predecessors. Among a number of illustrations, Oresme imagines that another world lies concentrically within ours -that is, it lies at the centre of our earth -and another world lies concentrically wrapped around our world; and another world lies concentrically around that world, and so on. Oresme did not take concentric worlds seriously. He regarded them as "Another speculation ... which I should like to toy with as a mental exercise". The world imagined inside our world would be very small and the worlds wrapped around our world would be very much larger than our world and become ever larger as we conceive of more and more concentric worlds further and further removed from our world. Do these differences in size signify that people and things inside these other worlds would be very small in worlds within our earth, and very large in worlds concentric to ours? In response to this problem, Oresme explains that "large and small are relative, and not absolute, terms used in comparisons". If, for example, between now and tomorrow, our world were made "100 or 1,000 times larger or smaller than it is at present, all its parts being enlarged or diminished proportionally, everything would appear tomorrow exactly as now, just as though nothing had been changed". 46 Oresme regarded the existence of concentric worlds as improbable, but not impossible, "because", as he expressed it, "the contrary cannot be proved by reason nor by evidence from experience, but also I submit that there is no proof from reason or experience or otherwise that such worlds do exist".
In rejecting the existence of other worlds, Aristotle had in mind worlds that were identical to ours. This was the version of a plurality of worlds that was usually considered in the Middle Ages. Aristotle believed that our spherical world could have only one circumference and centre. He therefore insisted that a plurality of worlds like ours would be chaotic because the heavy bodies of the different worlds would all seek to leave their worlds and come together in a single world, which Aristotle regarded as absurd.
As a direct consequence of an article condemned in 1277, 47 numerous scholastics also assumed that God moved the entire spherical cosmos with a rectilinear motion, leaving behind a void space formerly occupied by the cosmos. Oresme regarded the rectilinear motion of the cosmos as an absolute motion, because the motion was not relatable to any other body. Given the assumed conditions, Oresme accepted the motion of the cosmos as possible and plausible. But the very possibility of such a cosmic motion not only abandoned Aristotle's rejection of the possibility of void space, but also subverted his concept of place. Aristotle had assumed that the place of a body is the innermost, immobile surface of the body that surrounds it. In a plenistic world, every body is surrounded by another body that constitutes its place. Motion in our plenistic world is from place to place. But no body surrounds our cosmos and yet God moves it rectilinearly through a void space, even though the cosmos cannot be said, in Aristotelian terms, to be moving from one place to another. Nicole Oresme considered the rectilinear motion of the cosmos as an absolute motion, because the motion was not relatable to any other body. 48 The idea of God's moving the cosmos rectilinearly was also discussed in the early eighteenth century (1715) by Samuel Clarke, in his dispute with Gottfried Leibniz. Like Oresme, Clarke regarded such a rectilinear motion as an absolute motion. However, where Oresme's space was nondimensional, Clarke's was three-dimensional.
What Was Not Imaginary Beyond Our World
Aristotle had denied that anything -void space, matter, place, or time -could exist beyond our world, though he acknowledged that the human mind seemed naturally to imagine extracosmic existence. Already in the thirteenth century, some theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, imagined the existence of an infinite void space beyond our world. 49 But it was only imaginary. In the fourteenth century, the idea of an extracosmic vacuum was converted to reality. In his Questions on the Sentences, Robert Holkot (c. 1290-1349) assumed, along with virtually all other theologians, that God could create a body or another world beyond our world. Holkot then argued that if God could create another world, a vacuum must exist beyond our world to receive that world -whether or not God decided to create it. We have here an illustration of a counterfactual that had a real consequence. 50 It was Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1290-1349), however, who took the step that would have a significant impact far beyond the Middle Ages, exerting influence throughout the period of the Scientific Revolution. Bradwardine, a contemporary of Holkot's, united God with infinite void space. He did this around 1344, in a theological treatise titled In defence of God against the Pelagians (De causa Dei contra Pelagium). On the assumption that God is infinite and everywhere, Bradwardine assumed that God is, therefore, in an infinite void space. In a chapter entitled "That God is not mutable in any way", Bradwardine expressed his opinions in five corollaries, where he equated infinite void space with God's infinite omnipresent immensity. Because God is without extension, Bradwardine assumed that infinite void space must also be extensionless. Although it was very real for Bradwardine, he described the infinite void as "imaginary". In the fifth and final corollary, Bradwardine declares: "And it seems obvious that void can exist without body, but in no manner can it exist without God."
51 Bradwardine was probably the first to link God with an infinite void space, although that space was extensionless.
Nicole Oresme agreed with Bradwardine. Oresme believed in an extracosmic void because he had an intuitive sense that something had to exist beyond our world. As he expressed it in his Le livre du ciel et du monde, "the human mind consents naturally, as it were, to the idea that beyond the heavens and outside the world, which is not infinite, there exists some space, whatever it may be, and we cannot easily conceive the contrary". Some lines below, Oresme explains what that space beyond the heavens is:
Thus, outside the heavens, then is an empty incorporeal space quite different from any other plenum or corporeal space.... Now this space of which we are talking is infinite and indivisible, and is the immensity of God and God Himself, just as the duration of God called eternity is infinite, indivisible and God Himself.... 52 Although Oresme does not explicitly indicate whether infinite void space is extended or extensionless, it is likely that he would have agreed with Bradwardine that God and space are extensionless.
Medieval ideas about God and infinite void space "had an impact not only on scholastic authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries but also on major nonscholastic authors, such as Otto von Guericke (1602-1686), Henry More (1614-1687), Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), Isaac Newton (1642-1727), and Joseph Raphson (d. 1715 or 1716)". 53 In the seventeenth century, many came to assume that not only was infinite space three-dimensional, but God Himself was three-dimensional. In this group were Henry More, Isaac Newton, and Benedict Spinoza. Although More, Newton, and many others, thought of God as three-dimensional, they also regarded Him as incorporeal. It was Spinoza, however, who took the final step and made of God a material and corporeal entity. And so it was that the imaginary, extensionless infinite void space, first proposed in the fourteenth century by medieval theologiannatural philosophers, evolved into the God-filled, infinite three-dimensional, incorporeal space of Newtonian physics, and finally, in Spinoza's world, God became a three-dimensional corporeal being.
ConClusion
Medieval scholastic natural philosophers, most of whom were theologians, used reason, imagination, and a questioning methodology to make, and suggest, significant departures from Aristotle's natural philosophy. Although they did not use their departures from, and disagreements with, Aristotle to make significant revisions in his natural philosophy, they did fashion a spirit of inquiry that was disseminated throughout Western society. When to this new spirit of inquiry, in which the imagination played a vital role, were added the indispensable elements of observation, experiments, and the widespread and routine application of mathematics to problems in natural philosophy, early modern science emerged in what has traditionally been designated the Scientific Revolution.
